An interesting blog post on another site, Boots and Saddles, that compares excerpts from my book War Horse, on American cavalry marching in the 1880s, with modern day endurance riding. I think you will find the comparison very interesting. Check out the rest of the blog as well –some fun reading and great pictures.
The new army stability manual, FM 3-07, Stability Operations, proposes using lines of effort to visualize the execution of stability operations tasks. Specifically the manual states, “A line of effort links multiple tasks and missions to focus efforts toward establishing the conditions that define the desired end state. Lines of effort are essential in stability operations, where physical, positional references to an enemy or adversary are less relevant. In these operations, where the human dimension typically becomes the focus of the force, lines of effort often work best to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the end state. Lines of effort are essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power.” The history of U.S. stability operations validates the concept as expressed in current doctrine. It also offers some insights into the issues and importance of lines of efforts and stability operations in general.
For a presentation at the National Defense University entitled “Lessons of History: U.S. Transitions in Cuba and the Philippines,” I took the history of two U.S. stability operations and superimposed that history on the LOOs as outlined in FM 3-07. The results confirmed that, though they did not have a formal doctrine, the leaders of previous intensive stability operations, identified and executed critical tasks that align very closely with current doctrine.
Studying the history a little more closely revealed several important insights into stability operations:
1. The major influence on stability operations policy is domestic politics. Congressional control of budgets and the ability of the Congress to enact legislation that constrains or sets policy is a major influence on operations. Most importantly, the popular opinion of the American people, as expressed through their votes, has a strong influence on both the Congress and the Administration.
2. The American experience with stability operations includes both Civil and Military led operations. There was no obvious difference between the two. However, historically, the War Department (now DOD) was the lead agency and the civil administrator reported directly to the Secretary of War. One clear aspect of the historical experience is that there was no ambiguity regarding who was in charge.
3. Insurgent resistance to the stability operation has an important effect. This effect is not direct. Historically, the U.S. military has demonstrated a capability to eliminate insurgency. The important effect is on domestic public opinion. Insurgency’s most important capability is to influence U.S. domestic politics (see 1. above).
4. Economics and the economic LOO are extremely important. It is the key to long-term stability and is more important and difficult to achieve than building the institutions of governance. The latter are relatively simple to create but will fall apart if they are not supported by a sound economy. Often, because of U.S. domestic politics, the focus of stability operations is on economic matters that relate to the U.S. economy and diminish the importance of economic issues that relate to the indigenous population.
5. Cultural understanding is a key to assisting the indigenous population to achieve stability. U.S. institutions will never be a perfect fit to another culture. A deep understanding of culture is essential to making the critical decisions required for successful stability operations. Governance, security, and economic issues all depend on identifying policies and techniques that will work within the context of the unique operational environment. Leaders have to decide when to leave the culturally accepted method in place; when and how to adapt a unique foreign concept to the culture; and when and how to impose a completely foreign concept on the culture. Making the right decision is the key to success along the LOOs and cultural understanding is the key to the right decision.
6. Finally, stability operations are inherently difficult and complex. Each of the LOOs is related to and dependant on the others for success. They complement each other and set the conditions for each other’s success. The amount of time forces are engaged in stability operations permits the tasks within the LOOs to develop. As the individual tasks are accomplished, time permits their effects to mature and reinforce other tasks. Rushing stability operations incurs the risk that systems and institutions built as part of the stability operations will erode for lack of support in an immature environment that lacks a cultural history that supports those institutions and systems.
Historically speaking, who is more successful at post-conflict operations –a military governor or a civilian governor? Lets look at the record:
Philip Sheridan (Louisiana, Texas, Florida, 1865-1868 )
Leonard Wood (Cuba 1899-1902) :)George
William Howard Taft (Philippine Islands 1901-1905) 🙂
Charles MaGoon (Cuba 1906-1908 )
Frederick Funston (Vera Cruz 1916) 🙂
Henry Allen (Germany 1919-1923) 🙂
Lucius Clay (Germany 1945-1949) 🙂
Douglas MacArthur (Japan 1945-1950) 🙂
Paul Brenner (Iraq 2003-2005) 😦